



 NEVENA DIMITROVA Institute of Psychology, University of Lausanne    The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  bring  into  consideration  a  way  of  studying  culture  in  infancy.  An emphasis is put on the role that the material object plays in early interactive processes. Accounted as  a  cultural  artefact,  the  object  is  seen  as  a  fundamental  element  within  triadic  mother‐object‐infant  interactions  and  is  believed  to  be  a  driving  force  both  for  communicative  and  cognitive development.  In  order  to  reconsider  the  importance  of  the  object  in  child  development  and  to present an approach of studying object construction, accounts in literature on early communication development  and  the  importance of  the object are  reviewed  and discussed under  the  light of  the cultural specificity of the material object.    How  does  culture  influence  early  human  psychological  development?  How  can  we  find evidence for the way a child becomes a member of his or her surrounding cultural society? These  questions  have  shaken  developmental  scientists  since  the  importance  of  the interpersonal  relationship  dynamics  was  unanimously  admitted.  The  enormity  of  such questions  is  overwhelming  when  a  single  study  tries  to  address  it  in  order  to  provide general  laws  of  psychological  development.  However,  in  the  past  50  years,  important advances have been made. With many others, J.S. Bruner provided brilliant insights of the way  culture  shapes  the  mind.  In  one  of  his  most  known  studies,  he  found  that  young children’s social environment has an impact on the way they perceive the size of American coins – when a child is raised in a significantly poorer socio‐economic environment, he or she tends to overestimate the size of coins (Bruner & Goodman, 1947).   Among  the  classical  theories  of  child  development,  there  are  approaches  that  study  the influence  of  social,  cultural  and  historical  dimensions  on  the  child’s  psychological functioning. Vygotsky’s cultural‐historical theory is one of the most considered. He opened the  scope  of  studying  child  development  by  theorizing  that  the  mind  is  mediated  by cultural signs and only by accounting for those mediation processes, human psychology can be approached. According  to Vygotsky,  the  signs  that mediate  the mind are  the  linguistic signs; in an ontogenetic perspective, that means that the child’s psychological functioning starts to be mediated by culture when language emerges, around age 2. Before that, during the two first years of life, development is a fruit of the child’s internal biological processes. It  is  with  language  that  the  natural  and  cultural  lines  of  development would merge  and allow the development of higher mental functions.  Moro and Rodríguez (2005) questioned this nature‐culture dualism in the preverbal years. Since the infant is in constant relations with other people and artifacts, this necessarily has an impact on his or her development. The authors emphasized the fact that interaction and 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communication between a mother and an infant is highly influenced by an external object, such as a toy. In order to provide evidence for the cultural impact on development and how it can be studied, Moro and Rodríguez suggested to examine the way the mother transmits signs of how objects are used conventionally. According to this approach, mothers transmit social  and  cultural  knowledge  in  the  preverbal  years  (how  objects  are  used  in  a conventional way);  thus,  interesting  studies  of  how  this  transmission  shapes  the  child’s development could be suggested.  Following  the  approach  of  object  construction  in  infancy,  this  paper  aims  to  provide reflection on the importance of the material object in early child development.  In order to address  this  topic,  two  questions  are  asked:  What  is  the  importance  of  the  object  in literature on early communication development? How is the object considered in literature on the child’s psychological functioning? The first two sections deal respectively with these two  questions.  In  the  third  section,  I  provide  a  reflection  of  how  to  reconsider  the importance  of  the  object  according  to  its  cultural  specificity.  The  major  question  of  the conventional use of the object is presented in this section. In the fourth and last section, the approach  of  object  construction  in  infancy  (Moro & Rodríguez,  2005)  and  its  theoretical backgrounds are presented.   
The importance of the object in early communication development  In this section, I summarize some of the major topics in early development that engender fundamental progresses in communication development and I highlight the importance of the object in each of them.  A  qualitative  turn  in  development  of  communication  is marked  by  the  period when  the infant  starts  to  integrate  a  third  term  in  previously  dyadic  mother‐infant  interactions (Dunham & Moore, 1995). Around the age of 9‐10 months,  infants become able  to orient their  attention  both  to  another  person  and  to  an  external  object  or  event.  This  triadic ability  is  what  different  authors  refer  to  as  secondary  intersubjectivity  (Trevarthen  et Hubley, 1978), joint engagement (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984), joint attention (Tomasello, 1995), etc.   According to Adamson, Bakeman and Deckner (2004), episodes of shared attention with a caregiver  and  an  object  are  important  in  early  developmental  contexts  during  which children  gain  access  to  a  culture’s  ways  of  interacting  (Bruner,  1983)  and  to  its  tools, including  its  symbol  systems  (Vygotsky,  1978;  Werner  &  Kaplan,  1963).  Longitudinal research  shows  that  infant’s  joint  attention  skills  are  correlated with  various  aspects  of later development  such as  social understanding  (Charman,  et  al.,  2000),  representational skills in theory of mind (Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1993), language development (Bakeman & Adamson,  1984;  Bruner,  1974‐5;  Carpenter,  Nagell,  &  Tomasello,  1998;  McArthur  & Adamson,  1996;  Smith,  Adamson,  &  Bakeman,  1988;  Tomasello  &  Farrar,  1986)  and growing narrative skills (Bruner & Feldman, 1993).   These  and  many  other  studies  provide  rich  evidence  for  the  relationship  between  the development  of  early  communication  and  the  importance  of  the  ability  to  integrate  an 
Psychology & Society, 2010, Vol. 3 (1), 77 ‐ 91 79 
external object in the shared focus of attention. A quick look at the abilities involved in joint attention  processes  reveals  that  basic  cognitive  functions  such  as  attention,  intention, reference and pragmatics are built and enhanced during situations of mutual attending to an object.  Concerning  intentionality,  it  is  considered  as  a  milestone  in  the  child’s  communicative development  (Bruner,  1974‐5;  Harding  &  Golinkoff,  1979;  Locke,  1978;  Sugarman‐Bell, 1978; Tomasello, 1995). It emerges from child’s awareness that his or her behaviour has an effect on his or her surrounding caregivers. It starts with rudimentary behaviours such as crying which the caregiver  interprets as a signal  for discomfort and causes him or her to provide soothing, most often  feeding. The child then starts repeating these behaviours to provoke an effect on the caregiver. More complicated intentional behaviours emerge with the  ability  to  integrate  an  object when  interacting.  For  example,  when  a  child wants  an object out of reach, he or she would stretch the arm in the direction of  the object, which would  certainly  be  interpreted  by  the  caregiver  as  a  child’s  desire  for  the  object.  In  this respect,  the work of Elizabeth Bates’  team (1975, 1979) on preverbal pragmatics  (proto‐declaratives  and  proto‐imperatives)  can  be  seen  as  an  important  understanding  of  the impact  of  the  ability  to  integrate  an  object  in  interactions  on  the  child’s  communication development.  Closely  knit  to  this  last  aspect  of  early  communicative  competencies  is  the  notion  of reference (e.g. how the nature of the object attended to during joint engagement influences the development of reference). Establishing a relationship between things in the world and a means to refer to them is fundamental for communication development. Unlike the child from the example above who stretches his or her arm in vain attempt to reach the object, a more mature  form  of mutual  attending  to  things  in  the world  is  gained  when  the  child starts to use arbitrary codes in order to refer to things. As Bruner (1974‐5) puts it, the child performs  “a  sound, word  or  gesture  [that]  «stands»  for  something  in  the  extra‐linguistic environment” (p. 267). Reference is mainly seen in literature as a linguistic construct, but evidence taken from studies of the development of preverbal pragmatics indicates that its basis  is  set  up  in  the  pre‐linguistic  period.  Referring  together  to  an  external  entity  in infancy  is  essentially  referring  to  an  external  object.  Thus,  establishing  the  relationship between things  in  the world and a means to refer  to  them is clearly beginning  in  infancy. This process is believed to take place in episodes of active participation in pre‐established repetitive interactive routines, referred in the literature as formats (Bruner, 1983), scripts (Nelson,  1981),  frames  (Fogel,  1993),  etc.  This  last  aspect  of  psychological  development allows us to enter  the  field of meaning construction. With his or her capacity  to mutually attend to an object with another person, the child becomes increasingly more precise and conveys richer and more meaningful information to the social other. 
 From the several basic psychological aspects outlined above, we can argue that the capacity to  integrate  an  object  in  interaction  processes  is  essential  to  the  development  of  basic communicative  skills.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  although  authors  of  studies  on  early communication development  commonly acknowledge  the  importance of  the object,  these studies  remain  an  investigation  of  the  dyadic mother‐infant  interaction  and  its  effect  on development. 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Authors generally agree with models of communication development such as Werner and Kaplan’s theory of symbol formation (1963) which highlights the importance played both by  the  communicative  partner  and  the  object  in  interactions  called  primordial  sharing 
situations. Although heavy theoretical emphasis was put on the sharing aspect, the authors unfortunately  did  not  elaborately  discuss what  sharing  implies  in  terms  of  development (Adamson, 1995).   A recent and powerful account of the importance of the object is found in Vasudevi Reddy’s second‐person  approach  of  development  of  the  infant’s  connectedness  and  engagement with the other (minds) (2008). When discussing mainstream conceptions of attention, for example, she emphasize that “attention…is conceived of as a sort of psychological spotlight turned  on  to  the  world,  free‐moving  and  not  bound    to  the  things  it  aligns  upon,  thus independent  (or dis‐embodied)  from  the world  it  roves  in”  (p. 92) and discuss  that  such theorizing of attention is not relevant in explaining early pre‐conceptual infant dynamics of engagement with other people because “from such a dis‐connected definition, the only way in which we, as observers, could grasp or recognise attention would be to conceptualize it, to grasp  it  as an  ‘idea’”  (p. 92). The author  suggests  that,  in order  to  study  the advent of infant’s awareness of other’s attention (as a milestone of communication development), it is important to account of the participative, emotionally‐bound connectedness between the infant, the communicative partner and the external world. This account of the importance of the object in early interactions is highly relevant for the purpose of this article. However, without  neglecting  the  emotional  aspects  of  infant‐object‐partner  engagements  and  how they  lay the  foundations of children’s awareness of  the other, we go  further and question the  role  played  by  the  object  as  a  separate  and  specific  entity  in  these  early  interactive dynamics – how the object’s characteristics in term of its cultural practices could shape the young children’s psychological development.   To our knowledge, there are no studies on what effects the specificity of the object during triadic mother‐object‐infant  interactions  could have on communication development  (for example, how the nature of the attended object would influence development of reference). However,  there are  studies and different approaches  found  in  literature on how children perceive  and  understand  objects.  In  the  attempt  in  this  paper  to  bring  together  the importance  of  communication  development  and  the  importance  of  the  object,  the  next section  examines  how  the  object  is  studied  in  literature  concerning  child  psychological development  and  the  importance  that  authors  give  to  the  object  according  to  early psychological acquisitions.  
Approaches of the object in psychological development 
 In  the  following  section  I  summarise  the main  approaches  of  studying  the  object  and  its importance  in  the  development  of  child’s  psychological  functioning.  As  in  the  preceding section, the summary of the basic studies points to the dyadic nature of the investigations; however, in this section, the dyad is no longer a subject‐subject dyad (mother‐child) but a subject‐object dyad (child‐object). 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Interestingly,  in  the  classical  theoretical  view of  the development of object manipulation, neither the caregiver nor the object is seen as essential. The infant was expected to develop manual ability with objects resulting from inherent biological maturational processes and adaptive behaviours (Gesell & Amatruda, 1944).   Dyadic  accounts  emerged  only  later  in  the  second  half  of  the  last  century. A  less  innate, largely influential theoretical account of the importance of the object in early development was proposed by Piaget. According  to Piaget,  the psychological development of  the  child, including the processes of object manipulation in infancy, result from the active experience that  he  or  she  has  in  the  environment.  He  put  an  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  the 
experience even though this experience is fundamentally self‐generated.   For  Piaget  the  importance  of  the  object  lies  early  in  the  developmental  levels  that  he described. In the first level of psychological development that he described (i.e. the sensori‐motor  level),  the  object  plays  a  major  role  and  achieving  object  permanence  (the knowledge  that  the  object  has  continuity  of  existence  even  when  out  of  sight)  marks  a qualitative  turn  in  development,  which  allows  the  transition  to  the  next  developmental level (i.e. the pre‐operational stage). Piaget described the different stages of how the object becomes a stable content for the infant. For this purpose, he used a paradigm consisting of hiding objects and observing the child’s reaction.  According to Piaget, during stages 1 and 2 of the sensori‐motor level, the “universe of the baby is a world without objects” (Piaget & Inhelder,  1969,  p.  14)  ‐  when  an  object  disappears  from  the  baby’s  sight,  there  is  no reaction at all. It is during stage 3 that the child starts to react when an object disappears, especially  if  it  is an  interesting one, but  the child still will not search  for  it. Starting  from stage  4  (coordination  of  secondary  circular  reactions)  the  child will  search  for  a  hidden object and at stage 5 he or she will be able to find an object if it is hidden in various places. The sensori‐motor stage ends when the child starts  to make  inferences about  the various displacements of the object and succeeds in locating it. In order to explain these progresses, Piaget refers essentially  to  the biological  functional mechanism of assimilation. According to Piaget,  this  consists of  the  transformation of  the world by  the  child ‐ by  the  repetitive exercise of the biological schemes by the child, assimilation assures stability and allows the object to become permanent.   In Piaget’s theory of psychological development, a major emphasis is put on the subject – the child – as the unique creator of his or her understanding of the material world. Piaget was aware of the impact of social interaction on development since he stated that “human intelligence is subject to the action of social life at all levels of development from the first to the last days of life” (Piaget, 1977/1995, p. 278). His theory of psychological development incorporates  important  aspects  of  how  interpersonal  dynamics  influence  the  child  –  the relation  of  constraint  through  the  imposition  of  authority  and  group  traditions  on  the individual;  and  the  relation  of  cooperation  based  on  equality  and  reciprocity.  Although these  types  of  social  relations  are  important  contributions  to  the  understanding  of  the influence  of  the  social on  the  developing  child,  Piaget  discussed  them only  for  grown‐up children,  neglecting  the  impact  of  the  social  relations  in  the  early  years  (Muller  & Carpendale,  2000).  He  considered  that  “The  social  intervenes  before  language  through sensory‐motor  training,  imitation,  etc.,  though  without  essentially  modifying  pre‐verbal 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intelligence”  (Piaget,  1977/1995,  p.  38).  Among  other  aspects  of  psychological development,  this  view  directly  influences  the  way  Piaget  accounted  for  the  child’s comprehension  of  the  material  world.  Since  social  interactions  are  not  considered  as important  in  pre‐verbal  development,  the  only  way  a  child  can  gain  understanding  of objects is by solitary physical manipulation. This means that the only aspects of the object that the child can access to are the physical properties of the object (such as shape, texture, colour, etc). I will return at the end of this section on the limits of this viewpoint.  A  different  but  very  fertile  line  of  research  concerns  infants’  perception  of  objects.  The techniques which are used rely on behavioural measures of very young infants developed by T.G.R.  Bower  in  the 1960s;  this  consisted mainly  of observing  the  infant’s  reaction  to events that violate physical principles. Research teams like of the ones of Elizabeth Spelke and Renée Baillargeon performed numerous studies on topics of object perception such as object  unity,  violations  of  expectancy,  the  effect  of  object  size  on  its  visibility  and movement of the object under the effect of gravity (for an overview, see Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber,  &  Jacobson,  1992).  The  findings  reported  by  these  studies  shed  light  on fundamental  cognitive  processes  in  early  development.  The  authors  conclude  that  the nature of object perception is essentially inherent to the subject (very young infants have an awareness of  the world which would match that of adults) and emphasize the nativist interpretation of their findings.   Currently, the more commonly accepted approach in developmental psychology literature on how young children understand the object  is  the ecological approach of perception of James Gibson  (1979). Considered as  the major  contribution  to  the  studies of perception‐action  in  infancy,  this  approach  aims  to  explain  how  an  ‘organism’  can  regulate  the relationship with the environment due to the perception‐action relation. For our purposes in this paper, it is important to emphasize the role played by Gibson’s theory of affordances. According  to  this  theory,  objects  are  considered  as  transparent;  they  allow  direct,  non‐mediated understanding. Affordance means that the object affords an action. A ball affords to be bounced; a chair affords to be seated in. Thus, the theory of objects’ affordances relies heavily on the physical characteristics and properties of the object itself. A ball affords as well  to  be  smashed  and  a  chair  affords  to  be  thrown  by  the  window.  The  theory  of affordances even supports the idea that “each thing says what it is… a fruit says “Eat me”; water says “Drink me”; thunder says “Fear me”; and a woman says “Love me” (Koffka cited by  Gibson,  1979,  p.  138).  This  last  aspect  goes  beyond  the  direct  perception  of  object’s characteristics and accounts  for highly elaborated knowledge on how  to act on an object from the simple sight of it. Even though Gibson’s theory of affordances accounts for object’s functionality – something that the other studies summarized above omit –, the way to gain and  develop understanding  about objects  relies  again  only on  the  subject  and  his or her activities  on  it.  The  subject  remains  a  solitary  explorer  of  the  material  world.  Although some studies incorporate the contributions of caregivers to the development of perception‐action coupling entailed in object manipulation (Lockman & McHale, 1989), the findings are essentially  discussed  in  terms  of maximazing physical  information gain  from  the objects. Thus,  following  Gibson’s  theory  of  object’s  affordances,  the  only  qualities  and functionalities  of  the  object  that  the  subject  can  gain  access  to  are  the  object’s  purely physical ones. 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An important vein of research situated within the perception‐action theoretical framework aims to explain how motor development  influences the mind (Bertenthal & Clifton, 1998; Bushnell & Boudreau, 1993; Gibson & Pick, 2000; Schmuckler, 1993). Such studies provide data  on  how  infants  perform  various  kinds  of  physical  exploration  (fingering,  grasping, pushing objects) and how they learn the material variables as well as the changes in visual and auditory stimuli that objects provide  such as shape, dimension, texture, etc. (Lockman & McHale, 1989; Palmer, 1989; Ruff, 1984; Thelen & Fogel, 1986). Eleanor Gibson (1988) proposed  a  developmental  path  of  how  exploratory  competencies  in  infancy  –  all  active modes of discovering the object’s physical properties – are organized in successive stages. The  findings  of  Gibson’s  studies  point  to  the  role  played  by  subject‐object  interactions which allow an understanding of the physical characteristics of the material world.  Several other major theories of perception have been developed through the last century. Without  attempting  to  review  the  existing  theories  of  perception,  this  paper  aims  to provide an account of how  the developing  child would acknowledge and understand  the material world. The Gibsonian ecological approach of perception is commented essentially because  of  its  famous  conclusions of  how objects  are  perceived  and  understood  in  their (supposedly)  functional  aspects  (i.e.  affordances)  going  beyond  the  physical  aspects  of perception  (as  in  the  constructivist  approach).  The  “classical”  constructivist  approach  of perception of Helmholtz (see Rock, 1997) is generally opposed to the ecological, direct and proximal approach of Gibson because of its central assumption that perception is indirect and sustains interdependent relations with other perceptions. The constructivist approach is potentially closer  to  the understanding of  the mind as being mediated and not directly perceivable and thus it represents a fertile ground for bridging the gap between perceiving the world (in physical terms) and understanding it (in functional and/or semantic terms). A discussion of such an endeavor however surpasses the scope of this article.   It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  concerning  physical  perception  (e.g.  the  typically  studied question  of  size  perception),  attempts  have  been  made  to  reconcile  the  opposed approaches with new and promising findings for integration emerging from recent studies including  neurosciences  (see  e.g.,  Norman,  2002).  Future  research  is  needed  in  order  to provide not only further evidence for this interesting integration between immediate and mediate perception of the physical world but also in order to answer complex questions of how perception shapes the construction of meaning.  The common aspect of the approaches presented here (as representative of the studies on the importance of the object in psychological development) is that they consider learning from  the  physical  world  (tools,  i.e.  objects)  as  the  fruit  of  strictly  individual  physical exploration  of  a  subject  encountering  things  (subject‐object  dyadic  interactions).  It  is during  solitary  exploratory  behaviours  that  the  child  will  develop  his  or  her  perceptive competencies (colour, texture, weight etc.) of the objects and will gain an “insight” on the functional aspects of the object (e.g. a child would “test” by himself or herself what can be done with the object, its affordances). Certainly, for some objects that can be considered as highly “iconic” or analogical, this solitary manipulation and exploration of the object allows 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the child to “understand” the object in account for its functionality and utility (for example the child would understand by himself or herself what he or she can do with an object such as a ball). However, this hardly applies for the vast majority of objects in our surrounding material  world.  The  child  needs  an  adult  who  shows  how  things  should  be  done,  who adjusts the child’s clumsy attempts, who corrects the child’s wrong actions. In other words, in order to act on the material world and understand it, the child needs social interaction with a more knowledgeable person.   
Reconsidering the importance of the object and its cultural specificity  From  the  sections  above  we  can  summarize  that  a)  in  the  process  of  communication development,  the  ability  to  mutually  attend  to  an  external  object  is  fundamental  to subsequent developmental processes;  and b)  that  the object  and how  it  is perceived and acted  upon  by  the  developing  child  is  a  main  topic  in  developmental  cognitive  science. These  two  domains  of  study  concerning  the  object  differ  considerably:  studies  on  joint engagement and attention that focus on the communicative processes in development and thereby study essentially the mother‐infant relation; and studies on perception‐action that focus on the cognitive mechanisms developed during activities with the object and thereby study essentially the infant‐object relation. This means that the study of the importance of the  object  in  early  triadic  interactions  can  potentially  give  considerable  insights  on  both communicative and cognitive development. We consider that an integrated triadic study of mother‐object‐infant  interaction  with  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  role  of  the  object  can provide interesting perspectives of both communicative and cognitive development (Moro & Rodríguez, 2005). How can this be done? How can we “put  together” considerations of mother‐infant communication and infant’s understanding of the object?  What  is  suggested  here,  following  the  studies  of  Moro  and  Rodríguez,  2005,  is  to  give substantial credit to the role played by the object and its characteristics within the mother‐object‐infant interaction. From the first section presenting an overview of the main studies of  early  communication  development  in  infancy,  we  can  conclude  that  the  object  is acknowledged  as  important  but  that  no  studies  focus  on  its  role  and  impact.  From  the second  section  summarizing  leading  approaches  of  how  the  child  perceives  and  acts  on objects, we can conclude that  the characteristics of  the object  that are taken  into account are  the  object’s  physical  ones.  But  are  objects  only  defined  and  understood  by  their physical characteristics? Are objects only defined by what we can do with them (i.e. their affordances)? 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If one looks at this picture below and is not familiar with it, he or she will probably see a strange thing, possibly coming  from science‐fiction art; maybe he or she will think it is an alien; and he  or  she  probably  won’t  think  about  functionality  or  use. However,  this  is  an  object;  and  it  is  even  a  functional  and practical one; it is actually a kitchen accessory. Maybe even with this  information which characterizes the object a person won’t be  able  to  understand  the  object;  it  won’t  be  enough  to  start using the object from simply viewing it.                                         This  is what  the main  concern  is  about.  Objects  do  not  reveal their  function  and  use  from  simple  sight.  Objects  are  not transparent. We need more than perception and action in order to  be  able  to  act  on  them  in  their  conventional  use  (for  a discussion  of  the  convention,  design  and  goal  in  representing artificial  kinds,  see  German,  Truxaw,  &  Defeyter,  2007).  For example, the object here definitely affords to hurt someone for example; and that still does not give you any clue for the way we should use it.   What we do know about objects comes essentially from the way we observed others acting on them or what others told us about them. This object here is a citrus‐squeezer. You put a half citrus on the top, a glass under, you squeeze and the juice goes right down in the glass. It  is  an  unfamiliar  object  for  us  because  in  our  culture  and/or  historical  period,  citrus‐squeezers have different appearances and we are not used to infer this kind of information from such an object.  If  there are objects  that  can be  so difficult  for adults  to understand, with  all  the  background  they  have  from  experiencing  the material  world,  then  for  small children all  the objects would be unknown and they won’t  immediately know how to use them.   It is essentially within triadic mother‐infant‐interactions that mothers transmit the way the object should be used (in contrast by how an object can be used, i.e. its affordances). Most of the time, mothers are not aware of the fact that they transmit such conventional knowledge about  the  object  because  this  is  so  natural  and  obvious  for  them.  It  is  within  these interactive situations of sharing about nearby objects  that  early communication emerges, joint  engagement  and  attention  consolidates  and  communication  develops.  In  these situations, the infant gains considerable knowledge about the object which goes beyond the physical properties of the object. Conventional use of objects is the fruit of long processes of negotiations within  the members  of  a  culture  and  is  determined  by  the  historical  and temporal rhythm of a given society. Comparing the first patent of a telephone by A.G. Bell and Steve Jobs’ invention of the iPhone can give a nuanced example.  This account of object use is not new even though, to our knowledge, there are no studies that  explore  infant  or  child  development  from  this  perspective.  Similar  theoretical developments  have  been  provided.  Tomasello  (1999),  for  example,  discussed  object  use within the framework of greater developmental processes – in this case, what he refers to as cultural learning. He put strong emphasis on people’s intentionality when using an object 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in order to explain the perspective‐taking issues of how cultural learning becomes possible. What he calls the “intentional affordances” of an object mainly refers to the intentions that social agents have when communicating with others. Even though in this account there is recognition of  the  role played both by  the other and  the object,  the  author discusses  the object’s role  in  terms of  interpersonal dynamics between the communicative partner and his intentions and the child without a consideration of the cultural dimension of the object and  how,  in  the  processes  of  cultural  learning,  culture  could  possibly  mediate  child’s learning.  In  this  section,  the  question  of  how  we  can  theoretically  integrate  considerations  of mother‐infant communication and  infant’s understanding of  the object was addressed.  In the following section, the more precise question of how we can study the effects of triadic interaction on child’s development when accounting for the cultural specificity of the object will be addressed. A relevant approach will be presented.   
The semiotic approach of object construction in infancy  In order to study triadic mother‐object‐infant interactions with an emphasis on the object’s cultural  characteristics,  Moro  and  Rodríguez  (2005)  proposed  to  investigate  early interactions  from  a  semiotic  perspective.  This  approach  is  based  essentially  on  two theoretical backgrounds: Vygotsky’s theory of cultural‐historical development and Peirce’s semiotic model.   In Moro and Rodríguez’s approach of object construction, the importance given to the way mother  and  child  communicate  about  an  object  is  inspired  by  L.S.  Vygotsky’s  works (1934/1997) of mediation of the mind by the sign. According to Vygotsky and the majority of  the  Russian  school  of  psychology  of  the  first  half  of  the  20th  century,  development  of psychic functions is conceived as the progressive appropriation of the culture mediated by the  signs.  As  Zittoun,  Gillespie,  Cornish,  and  Psaltis  (2007)  describe,  in  “the interpsychological relation [:]  the mother mediates  the relation of  the child toward some object – a  subject‐other‐object  triangle – and this  leads to  the creation of  a sign” (p. 214, emphasis  in  original).  The  advent  of  the  cultural‐historical  development  goes  by  the internalization  of  the  cultural  signs.  In  Vygotsky’s  account  of  psychological  functioning, only  the  analysis  of  the  meanings  contained  in  the  systems  of  signs  allows  the understanding of the development of mental processes.   In  the  study  of  triadic  interactions,  this means  to  investigate  how  the mother  transmits culturally‐specific  communicative  behaviours  (i.e.  the  signs  that  she  uses  when communicating with her child; cf. empirical studies of Moro & Rodríguez, 2005) and then to account of the processes of how the child internalizes and generalizes these signs in order to be able to make conclusions about the impact of cultural knowledge on the developing mind.   Although the semiotic approach of object construction relies on the theory of mediation of the psyché by the signs, Moro and Rodríguez (2005) differ on one considerable aspect from Vygotsky’s  theory.  Vygotsky  considered  that  the mediating  activity  of  the  sign  is  closely 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related  to  the  linguistic  signs.  Thus  he  gave  exclusive  importance  to  language  in  the primary  process  of  development  of  higher  psychological  functions,  as  highlighted  in  the introduction. Moro and Rodríguez contest  that cultural  transmission only occurs with the advent of linguistic signs. Interaction in the preverbal period between the mother and the infant is considered equally as important, since mothers use various cultural signs in order to communicate with their children.  In order to study the cultural signs that mothers use when communicating with their preverbal infants, the authors put a heavy emphasis on the role of  the object  in  the  interacting triad and the  importance of  the object’s conventional use.  They  considered  that  any  communicative  behaviour  concerning  the  object’s conventional  use  is  culturally  determined  and  thereby  should  be  considered  as  a sign;  a preverbal sign. This conception of the sign as being not only verbal but also preverbal deals with Vygotsky’s dichotomy of development in the preverbal period. According to Vygotsky, in  the  preverbal  period  there  is  only  a  natural  line  of  development;  the  child  develops according  to  his  or  her  biological mechanisms  and  culture  does  not  have  any  impact  on psychological  development.  Cultural  mediation  begins  as  the  child  starts  to  use  and understand linguistic signs, around the second birthday. By suggesting that communicating about  object’s  conventional  use  can  be  interpreted  as  a  pre‐linguistic mediating  activity, Moro and Rodríguez (2005) opened the scope of studies on culture influences on the very early developing mind.   In order to analyze and interpret the preverbal communicative acts and how they convey cultural meaning, Moro and Rodríguez refer to the works of C.S. Peirce on semiotics (1966). Peirce’s  theory  of  signs  is  a  theory  of  reasoning  and  of  cognition which  asserts  that  all modes of thinking depend on the use of signs. He argues that every thought is a sign, and that  every  act  of  reasoning  consists  of  the  interpretation  of  signs.  Signs  function  as mediators between the external world of objects and the internal world of ideas. ‘Semiosis’ is  defined  as  the  process  by  which  representations  of  objects  function  as  signs  and  is conceived as a process of cooperation between signs, their objects, and their ‘interpretants’ (i.e.  their mental  representations).Unlike  Ferdinand de  Saussure’s  theory  of  signs, which crystallizes meaning as a direct representation between a signifier and signified, according to Peirce, ‘meaning’ is a triadic relation between a sign, an object, and an interpretant. This triadic relation is not reducible to a set of dyadic relations between a sign and an object or between  an  object  and  an  interpretant  (CP  1.345).  Breaking  with  traditional  dualistic conceptions  of  symbolization,  Peirce’s  triadic  theory  of  signs  “makes  possible  the articulation of the semantic universes between the subjects themselves, in a tight relation with the world, particularly the world of objects…” (Moro & Rodríguez, 2005, p. 127).   With  the  approach  of  object  construction  in  infancy,  new  horizons  of  studying communication and cognition in early development are opened. Observing triadic mother‐object‐infant  interactions could provide  insights of how culture mediates  the mind of  the growing  child  when  looking  closely  at  the  communicative  dynamics  of  how  partners mutually  attend  to  an  object.  By  being  the  focus  of  attention,  the  object  and  its characteristics make communicative partners  exchange,  elaborate,  and negotiate  cultural meaning.  These  dynamics  allow  the  development  of  both  communicative  and  cognitive functions.  Studying  these  functions  provides  an  integrated  approach  of  how  complex psychological functioning develops. 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DISCUSSION 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